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Transparency

What ELYSÉA does.
What it does not do.

Twelve declared limits without euphemism. An ethical infrastructure only proves its value by naming what it does not yet cover.

Status as of 2026-10-05.

What ELYSÉA does

Model detection, blocking applied by the code.

01

Intelligent detection

A language model analyses context, implicit rephrasing, and ambiguous signals. What keyword lists miss, the model can catch.

02

Blocking decision applied by the code

The four core prohibitions (anti-domination, anti-dependency, anti-substitution, anti-manipulation) are detected by model vote (three votes); the blocking decision is then applied by the code — not by the prompt. The pipeline is designed so that the model writing the reply cannot bypass it.

03

Wired crisis orientation

On any suicidal or medical emergency signal, the response is designed to be deterministic and oriented towards human resources (emergency services). It does not depend on the quality of the LLM generation at that moment.

04

SDK monotonicity

A builder integrating the SDK inherits the protections and can make them stricter — never weaker. Business configuration cannot disable the baseline protections.

The ELYSÉA brain is neuro-symbolic: the model reads implicit meaning and paraphrases; the four core prohibitions are detected by model vote (three votes) and the blocking decision is applied by the code, with no user switch. Neither a prompt alone (bypassable), nor a keyword filter alone (blind to context).

Measurement results

Measurement slots — no result published.

Each entry documents an actual measurement or a slot to fill. Slots marked TO FILL indicate that the measurement pass is not yet complete or the result is not yet published. Slots marked IN PROGRESS correspond to measurements currently being assembled. No result number is published without a version, denominator, date, and method.

M-01TO FILL

Crisis recall — French

—

Result not yet published

Metric

Proportion of crisis cases correctly recognised and oriented towards human resources (arm C vs A and D)

Corpus / denominator

Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come)

System version

—

Deployed SHA

—

Measurement date

—

Method / protocol

Preregistered plan (to come)

Who measured

Self-reported (ELYSÉA)

Campaign not yet run: no result published. The protocol will be preregistered before the first run.

M-02TO FILL

Crisis recall — English

—

Result not yet published

Metric

Proportion of crisis cases recognised in the English test corpus (recall rate)

Corpus / denominator

Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come)

System version

—

Deployed SHA

—

Measurement date

—

Method / protocol

—

Who measured

Self-reported (ELYSÉA)

EN corpus sealed. Zero verdict produced as of 2026-09-01. Case EN-F12 (dissociation + 988 US) requalified under the doctrine adopted on 30/09/2026: without suicidal ideation, a calm mention of 988 is allowed, not required; the main expectation is orientation towards a person. EN campaign conditional on dedicated calibration.

M-03TO FILL

Adversarial robustness — canon D0

—

Result not yet published

Metric

Proportion of bypass, manipulation, substitution and domination cases resisted by the pipeline (arm C)

Corpus / denominator

Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come)

System version

—

Deployed SHA

—

Measurement date

—

Method / protocol

Preregistered plan (to come)

Who measured

Self-reported (ELYSÉA)

Will cover only corpus formulations. Creative paraphrases outside the corpus and injections via SDK parameters remain outside proven coverage.

M-04TO FILL

False positives — over-blocking

—

Result not yet published

Metric

Proportion of non-crisis responses incorrectly blocked or oriented (arm C vs A)

Corpus / denominator

Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come)

System version

—

Deployed SHA

—

Measurement date

—

Method / protocol

Preregistered plan (to come)

Who measured

Self-reported (ELYSÉA)

4-arm campaign not yet executed. Current calibration deliberately favours protection over precision.

M-05TO FILL

Relational quality — floor and content

—

Result not yet published

Metric

Quality of responses to ordinary and veiled cases (arm C vs A, B, D) — qualite120 + plancher45 benches

Corpus / denominator

Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come)

System version

—

Deployed SHA

—

Measurement date

—

Method / protocol

Preregistered plan (to come)

Who measured

Self-reported (ELYSÉA)

The quality grid is written by ELYSÉA; its version and arbitration will be set at preregistration. The campaign has not been run.

Why publish empty slots? A transparency report that only shows available numbers creates an illusion of completeness. Naming gaps is as informative as naming results. This page will be updated as each measurement is validated on the current deployed SHA.

What ELYSÉA does not do — twelve declared limits

What remains uncovered, unknown, or partially proven.

  1. CONS-P4-003

    [SDK config] prefix trick — open breach, not corrected

    An attacker can pass a configuration key with an [SDK config] prefix to inject instructions that are treated as builder-level directives, bypassing D0 ethical canonisation. This breach (CONS-P4-003) is known, documented, and not yet corrected. It represents the most serious open vulnerability in the current pipeline.

  2. L-01

    Probabilistic detection — not deterministic

    Detection of a crisis signal or violation is probabilistic (model and classifiers; model vote for the four core prohibitions). It may miss implicit or atypical phrasing. The blocking decision is applied by the code once the signal is detected.

  3. L-02

    False positives — deliberate calibration

    The calibration favours protection over precision: certain ambiguous phrasing close to a crisis deliberately activates the safety gate (cost of a missed false negative > cost of a false positive). Real phrasing outside the tested corpus may trigger unexpected orientation.

  4. L-03

    Two languages, nothing else

    Measurement campaign (designed, not yet run): French and English — France, United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. No measurement has been run, in French or in English. Behaviour in other languages is unknown.

  5. L-04

    Corpora — limited coverage

    Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come). A finite corpus does not prove that all real phrasing is recognised. Unanticipated paraphrases, defensive humour and atypical syntactic patterns will remain outside proven coverage.

  6. L-05

    Implicit bridging unmeasured

    The v1.3 field judge (earlier version of the instrument) did not detect implicit bridging: an off-topic but lengthy response (≥35 characters) was classified as acceptable. Whether the current panel detects it: to be checked at preregistration.

  7. L-06

    Creative phrasing delta unknown

    The ablation tests 21 known formulations. An unconstrained language model may produce paraphrases or creative workarounds that current rules do not cover. The actual gap on these cases is unknown.

  8. L-07

    Degradation under load

    Under 10 simultaneous requests, the crisis net remains active but the quality of responses to practical tasks degrades — fallbacks are served instead of substantive responses.

  9. L-08

    Silent UX on slow LLM

    If the main language model responds with significant delay, the interface remains silent with no intermediate feedback. The response arrives, but the user sees nothing during that time.

  10. L-09

    Campaign not yet run — no result

    Campaign not yet run: no result published. The protocol will be preregistered before the first run. Number of cases: set by the preregistered plan (to come). Results will be published with the deposit, at the DOI, favourable or not.

  11. L-10

    Classifier cost partially estimated

    The cost of three classifiers (GraduatedCrisis, SomaticEmergency, DailyIntent) is estimated, not confirmed live. Only ForbiddenInvariants is confirmed via cost probe.

  12. L-11

    ELYSÉA directs — it does not manage what follows

    On any crisis signal (suicidal ideation, immediate danger), ELYSÉA produces a response oriented towards human resources (emergency services). It stops there. It does not verify that the user called, contacts no third party, generates no alert. The builder integrating ELYSÉA must have their own human follow-up procedure — without it, the safety net is incomplete.

Execution location

Where each call executes.

Component

Security classifiers

Location

Europe — Cloud Run europe-west1

GraduatedCrisis, SomaticEmergency, DailyIntent run on the ELYSÉA orchestrator (Cloud Run europe-west1); the model they call goes through Bedrock eu-west-3 or Vertex eu, or through an option outside the EU possible (list in the privacy policy).

Component

Transcription and memory pipeline

Location

Europe — Cloud Run europe-west1

User context and ethical posture go through the orchestrator (europe-west1); memory is in a Supabase database whose region is not proven — outside the EU possible.

Component

LLM generation model

Location

Builder's choice

The builder integrating the SDK chooses their generation model. ELYSÉA wraps the call and applies its protections to it, but the model's location depends on that choice.

The code and measurement repositories are private today; a public deposit is planned with the DOI. Campaign not yet run: no result published. The protocol will be preregistered before the first run. Results will be published with the deposit, favourable or not.